A Dialogue On Personal Identity And Immortality Pdf

a dialogue on personal identity and immortality pdf

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He could not stay angry at her for long. He liked people who stood up to him, although with her, he believed, it was less a case of courage than of stupidity: she did not seem to realize just how dangerous he was, or how vindictive he could be. Or maybe she did know, and did not care.

Naming, Necessity, and More pp Cite as.

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Personal Identity and Ethics

Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. Perry Published Psychology. Perry's excellent dialogue makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or thoroughness. Professionals will appreciate the work's command of the issues and depth of argument, while students will find that it excites interest and imagination. Save to Library.

You are a person. Presumably, you used to be a younger person. But, in virtue of what is it the case that you and that younger person are one and the same individual? In other words, how is it that you continue to exist over time? There had better be something that grounds our continued existence, for we make judgments that presume that people continue to exist every day—for instance, when we assign rewards and punishments to them, or moral obligations, or property rights, and so on:.

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A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality

The lecture focuses on the question of the metaphysical key to personal identity. What does it mean for a person that presently exists to be the very same person in the future? Difficulties with that approach are then discussed, independent of the question whether souls exist or not. Chapter 1. For those of you who still do believe in the existence of souls, I suppose you could take a great deal of the discussion that follows as some form of large conditional or subjunctive. First, we had to get clear on, what am I? What are my parts?

It deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a terminally ill university professor at a small Midwestern college, Gretchen Weirob, and her two friends, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen. The format of associating different philosophical positions with different characters in a dialogue recalls David Hume 's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. David M. Rosenthal believes that the book is appropriate for both professionals and students because it "makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or thoroughness. This article about a philosophy -related book is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

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Definition of Survival : To survive means that there would be someone for whom it would be appropriate for me to anticipate having their future experiences. You are here now, and then in the future, there will be someone who is you. The moral: exact or very close similarity similarity does not amount to identity. Unlike Kleenex boxes, we have immaterial minds or souls that allow us to track identity across time. To say that one person is identical to another is to say that they have the same immaterial souls.

В комнате тут же стало тихо. Старший дешифровщик, нескладный тип по имени Морант, не выпускавший сигареты изо рта, недоверчиво уставился на Беккера. - То есть вы хотите сказать, что эти знаки имеют множественное значение. Беккер кивнул.

Хейл хмыкнул.


Zemira B.


What justifies our holding one person over another morally responsible for a past action?